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by Howard Adelman
operation Peace in the Calilee and
the Beirut Siege constitute the first
\l'ar Israel has fought agalllst the PLO.
The Yarn Kippur War, the Six Day
War, the '1956 Suez War and even
the War of Independence were
fought against Arab states. This does
not mean that the PLO (bd not
participate in previous battles, but
onlv that the pnnClpal military forces
\\'e(e those of Arab states not ident-
ified as PLO Nor does it mean that
this war v\'as fought exclusively against
the PLO; we are all aware of the
baltles fought with the Syrians in
the Bekail Valley, the reported 80
Syrian jets destroyed versus one
Israeli jet lost, and the capture of the
Beirut-Damascus highway from the
Syrians. cutting off the supply lines
of the PLO (and Syrians) in west
Beirut. But in the public mind -- and
in reality -- the war was fought
against the military forces of the PLO.
Israel fought and won a war against a
'"nation" which does not have a state.
The war was unique in a number
of other respects. This was the first
war in vvhich Israel's militalY objective
was not simply the defeat of its
enemy in battle_ The goal was much
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larger - the destruction of the
enemy's capacity to fight. This military
aim did not apply to the Syrians
however; for them Israel sought the
withdrawal of their military presence
from Lebanon, But the ousting of the
Syrians was not undertaken by mili-
tary means, at least until now, In any
case it is clear that Israel's objective
with respect to the Syrians is not the
destruction of their military capability.
That goal is confined to the PLO
operation, and notwithstanding this
limitation, it still constitutes a tall
order.
To accomplish the destruction of
an enemy's military capability, the
military might of the enemy must be
so shattered, its alliances with its
suppliers and supporters must be
severed, internal cohesiveness and
morale must be broken, so that the
idea of rebuilding or recreating a
military force capable of attacking
Israel is universally perceived to be
one of Don Quixote's impossible
dreams. These tasks are all extremely
difficult endeavours, yet they are
nevertheless insufficient in them-
selves to destroy an enemy's capacity
to fight. For the enemy must not only
be thoroughly defeated and routed
in the field, but the field must be
eliminated on which the enemy can
wage a military battle. The Romans
did this to the Jews in the Bar Kochba
rebellion in 132 AD.; Israel's capacity
to fight was destroyed for almost
2,GOO years.
The political objectives of the
war were also different, for not only
was the war intended to destroy the
militaly capacity of the PLO, it was
also designed to liquidate the PLO's
infrastructure in Lebanon. The PLO
was to be eliminated as a political
force in Lebanese politics.
Palestinians arrived in Lebanon
as refugees of the 1948 war. Later a
small number of Palestinian refugees
came after the 1967 war. A much
larger number of militants arrived
following King Hussein's suppression
of the PLO in Jordan during Black
September in 1970, after 20,000 of
their number had been killed. By
1975 they had become an economic
and social force in Lebanese politics.
In the civil war of 1975-76 they
established themselves as the most
potent militaly force among all the
feuding factions in Lebanon. From
despised refugees, the PLO had
become the effective rulers of
significa~t sectors of the Lebanese
mosaic. And from that base their
economic and social infrastructure
grew exponentially. Never before
had the Israelis waged war to elimin-
ate the political infrastructure of their
enemy even from territory which they
captured and some hoped to annex.
And Lebanon was a territory over
which they had no claims whatso-
ever.
The war had a second unique
political aim. This was the first time
Israel set as its objective the detenni-
nation of the political character of an
adjacent political state - the estab-
lishment of a strong central govern-
ment in Beirut. Previous wars had
been fought as clear exercises in self-
defence when Israel was attacked or
as pre-emptive battles to prevent
Israel from being attacked. They were
defensive military wars in which the
Israel Defense Forces (I D F) was clear-
ly that, a citizen army of defense.
Although a case can be made for
Operation Calilee as a defensive war,
(Israel's life was not at stake, but the
peace and quiet and morale of its
northern settlements in Israel were),
the Beirut siege could not be said to
be self-defensive. The PLO presence
in Beirut could pose no significant
immediate military threat to Israel.
The destruction of the PLO in Beirut
was required to meet a larger military
objective, i.e. the destruction of the
PLO's capacity to fight, as well as a
political objective involving the
establishment of a strong central
Lebanese government which
required the elimination of the
PLO infrastructure. Clearly, these are
not objectives of an underdog. They
are the goals of a state which is well
established as a regional power,
willing to use the military as an
alternative means of practicing poli-
tics.
If the objectives differed from
previous walS, the context did as
well. This is generally acknowledged
as the first Israeli warfought without a
national consensus of support. No
doubt a majority -- perhaps even a
large one -- backed Begin's war. In
fact, the support for Operation
Galilee could be said to be over-
whelming. But even that fell far short
of the traditional consensus. More
importantly, the Labour Party ob-
jected to the invasion of West Beirut,
which Begin was clearly committed
to undertake if diplomacy failed to
rout the PLO. One of Israel's young-
est and most distinquished military
commanders resigned from the
armed services rather than be faced
with refusing a command to lead his
troops into Beirut, an unprecedented
move. Rallies of close to ., 00,000
opposing the war took place in Tel-
Aviv, while Israeli soldiers were dying
in the field.
While Israelis were far from
united in supporting the war, world
opinion was almost uniform in vilify-
ing Israel's conduct of the war. The
calumnies were bad enough --
700,000 refugees produced by the
Israeli invasion of south Lebanon and
40,000 civilian casualties when, in
fact, there were less than 50,000
homeless Palestinians and Lebanese
resulting from the initial operation
and less than 4,000 casualties accord-
ing to the official account of the
municipal authorities. Yet at least two
rabbis, I. F. Stone, Stude Terkel, and
numerous other celebrities allowed
their names to be put under a
protesting advertisement. (No sub-
sequent correction appeared to my
knowledge.) And what is worse than
the lies - for that is what such gross
distortion of fact must be labelled -
is the fact that they were widely
believed. Large numbers of North
Americans and Europeans were pre-
pared to believe the worst libels
about Israel while, at the same time,
Palestinians in south Lebanon, who
were available for interviews and
whom I later indeed did interview,
acknowledged that through the war
they had learned the realities about
the Israelis. They were neither mon-
sters, on the one hand, as they had
been led to believe, nor supermen
on the other hand, as they feared.
Rather, they were a sloppily dressed if
effective military force, who by and
large acted to avoid civilian casualties
in Operation Galilee. In spite of
these facts, which did not even need
to be verified to be doubted since all
of south Lebanon contained less
than 700/000 inhabitants/ large
numbers of individuals were pre-
pared to cast Israel beyond the pale
of civilization just as they were once
ready to believe blood libels against
Jews in Eastern Europe. What
shocked Israelis is not that such lies
were told, but that they were be-
lieved. And the rhetoric used against
Israel included charges of "exter-
mination", a "final solution", "geno-
cide" -- the language of the holo-
caust now thrust at Jews themselves.
When the evidence "vas clearly
available for everyone to know the
truth, it was largely ignored, as
attention shifted to Beirut. Israel was
depicted as wantonly slaughtering
civilians, hitting schools and bomb-
ing hospitals. It may be that while I
vvas in Lebanon and Beirut some
articles did appear in newspapers
and magazines accusing the PLO of
holding civilians as hostages to save
some remnant of their power and
prestige. But the "moral" outrage
seemed to be overwhelmingly and
uniformly directed at Israel.
All this happened while American
policy was never more dearly con-
gruent with Israeli political and mili-
tary goals, though diverging on
tactics. One reason for the lack of
Israeli consensus supporting the war
and overvvhelming outrage aimed at
Israel was yet another unique charac-
teristic of this war. For the conduct of
the war was also radicallv different, as
were the objectives and the context.
This was Israel's first urban war. It
is true that in previous wars, Port Suez
in Egypt and Kuneitra in Syria had
been levelled. But this was the first
war in which the primary targets were
the PLO military installations en-
sconsed in the urban landscapes of
Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. The targets
were cities and the ultimate target
was a capital city. Civilian casualties
were regrettable, yes, but an ineVi-
table consequence of such a war
however hard one tried to avoid
them. Traditional Israeli compassion
which had made the Israelis the
highest contributors per capita to the
plight of Cambodians following the
Vietnamese invasion of that hapless
country, that truly deep-felt sympathy
for all loss of human life was, in this
war, subsumed under military and
political objectives of a radically
different order.
The first days of the war pro-
duced a hero, Yekutiel (K:lti) Adam,
who led the capture ot Beaufort
Castle. As a member of Shelli, (the
Israeli party opposed to all aspects of
the war), he was the highest ranking
officer to die in the war and the only
one perceived as a true war hero.
Every other Israeli war produced a
galaxy of heroes. An Israeli soldier
stated his feelings most revealingly
on an Israeli Friday evening lV
broadcast - 'in this war we don/t
feel like heroes'; and this, in spite
of the fact that manv Israelis
died trying to avoid killing civilians.
Branded on Western media as civ-
ilian killers with pictures of injured
and maimed individuals being
rushed into West Beirut hospitals,
presumably destroyed by Israeli
shells, at the same time dubious of
the validity of the extensiveness of
the war, and fighting an enemy the
destructive character of which clearly
posed no real threat to Israel's
existence though it threatened Israeli
life and property, Israelis could
acknowledge the results and even
cheer the superior military skill of the
Israeli pilots and their brilliantly
executed battles against the Syrians,
but for manv it was difficult to feel
heroic:. Thou'gh the war was fought
with political intelligence and excep-
tional technical skill, this was a war of
one of the best equipped and best
trained armies against a smaller and
divided militaly force noted for its
enormous stores of arms and am-
munitions, signs of conspicuOUS
nsumption and striving for status
cOthCl' than any evidence of the PLO's~ h . Ibility to use suc armaments Inte-~gentlY dn,d..effectively in the vast
(uanutws ell-cumulated.
I But the conduct of the war
differed in a much more important
'espect. For the first time in Israel's
:listo IV, the initiative was in the hands
~f the nlilitary rather than in those of
the politicians. It is widely believed
;hat ShJron tricked the hawkish Israeli
cabinet into going beyond the orig-
inal 40 km goal of the war. On June
8th, Begin clearly assured Israelis that
"the fighting will cease after Israel
reaches 4() km." But Sharon plunged
on to the borders of Beirut, then to
the Damascus··Beirut highway, on to
the airport and the Palestinian camps
in the south of West Beirut, and then
to the museum and Hippodrome at
the museum checkpoint at the
entrance to the Champs Elysee of
West Beirut. Though the cabinet
probably sanctioned the lalter moves
in principle, evidence seems to be
that even the cdbinet and perhaps
Begin himself were surprised by the
earlier moves on Beirut. And finally,
by mid-August, Begin and the
cabinet hJd to publiciy rein in Sharon
following a sustained bombardment
of Beirut.
If the nature of the war differed,
if its objectives were so qualitatively
at acids with previous wars, if dom-
estic dissent and international public
opinion distinquished the contE-~xt of
this war from all other Israeli wars, if
the conduct and control of initiatives
had shifted to the military, how
woulcl all of this be reflected in terms
of consequences? Repeatedly, news
comments on the war reiterated the
refrain that though a complete mili-
tary victory, the war was politically
lIseless. Israeli commentators did not
go so far. They frequently dis-
tinquished between the results of
Operation Galilee and the siege of
Beirut. For example, Abba Eban
declared that "the war in Beirut. .. has
Ilot brought Israel a single gain that
was not in our hands when the first
phase was ended in mid-June."
(Jerusa/em Post, Aug. 6, 1982).
Whether or not one agrees with
the siege of Beirut. it did bring
Conscquences that went well beyond
the results of Operation Calilee;
[whether one considers them gains
Or not depends on one's perspec-
tives!. In the first phase of the war, the
Syrians were severely mauled. In the
second they were made politically
impotent in Lebanon after the cap-
ture of the Beirut-Damascus highway,
and the capital was freed from the
pressure of the Syrian military pres-
ence. More importantly, the PLO was
destroyed as a military force. Whether
their military potential was also
destroyed depends on develop-
ments in the West Bank and Caza,
but certainly their capacity to use
Lebanon as a military base was
eliminated. Operation Calilee began
the process; the siege of Beirut
finished it.
The PLO as an economic power
was also dealt a severe blow. The
various factions of the PLO controlled
industries, financial institutions, real
estate interests, as well as the ports of
Tyre, Si don, and Beirut, dominating
them far more effectively than the
International L.ongshoremen's Union
ever controlled the east coast ports of
the United States. The PLO-directed
Sidon steel works Uv1a'assase al-
Mechanikiya al-Hadithl, which
monopolized the Lebanese market,
has since been expropriated by the
Israelis as enemy property. The Arab
Bank, more popularly known as the
Fatah Bank, has had its human
foundations torn away. It is unlikely
however, that the extensive real
estate interests will be affected unless
the new Lebanese government
decides to expropriate them. In
Aabda, just north of Sidon, where a
Lebanese official living in the area
told me that 75% of the apartment
buildings are owned by Palestinians,
it will be hard to distinquish betvveen
those owned by PLO and those
representing the investments of the
hard-earned savings of Palestinians
returning from Abu Dhabi or Kuwait.
However, the capitalist powers
of the PLO did not compare to its
control of labour, evidenced by the
fact that the port workers were
ovelwhelmingly Palestinian. Through
PLO control of the ports, not only
were arms and imports effectively
managed, but also duties were levied
to put competitors out of business
and to give the PLO an economic
monopoly in one economic ~ector
after another.
But if the PLO military power was
destroyed and PLO economic power
was severely damJged, its social
power remains largely intact. For the
base of the PLO social services is the
UNWRA-funded schools, clinics and
welfare services. The PLO not only
prevented UNWRA from keeping
track of refugees in the camps, but
effectively determined the curricu-
lum and staffing of the schools and
clinics and how the rations were
distributed. As one senior Palestinian
UNWRA official said to me in Sidon,
I'we will carrv on and will not deal
with the Israe'lis as long as our leaders
are penned up in West Beirut",
(where they still were at that time).
UNWRA is the American HEW
(Health, Education and Welfare
Agency) of the Palestinians, but one
financed by the international com-
munity rather than domestic taxes.
The PLO was thereby free to invest
the monies from the Arab Gulf States,
Iran and Libya into a surfeit of military
supplies and reasonably well run if
well protected business enterprises.
The war has not only affected the
military and economic structures of
Palestinian life in L.ebanon, it has
freed the Lebanese from PLO
domination. More importantly, how-
ever, it frees Palestinians from PLO
control. For those anti-PLO Palestinians,
who arrived in Lebanon in 1948 and
suffered with repressed rage at the
Johnny-come-Iatelys of 1967 and
1970, were subjected to a force
which controlled their lives. As one
said to me, he was ready to speak
out publicly against the PL.O as soon
as the Israelis had destroyed .- not
removed -- the militants in Beirut.
Why not earlier? He did not want to
feel thev could sneak back into the
region ~nd assassinate him as they
had once killed his brother. The PLO
exodus from Beirut does allow
Palestinian to disagree with Palestinian
on the use of force, and does free the
Lebanese from PLO control - both
of which would never have been
possible if Israeli military action had
been restricted to 40 km. And
Lebanese freedom from PLO control
refers not onlv to the Christians. Two
months before the Israeli invasion,
the Shiites led bv AMAL, turned
against their former allies, the PLO.
Some Lebanese and Palestinians are
willing to sacrifice the last drop of
Israeli blood to get rid. of the
swaggering domination of the PL.O.
The psychological effects of the
war on the PLO is even more
sign ificant. The '1948 Palestin ian
refugees in Lebanon, who almost all
came from the villages and cities
\·vhich are now part of northern Israel,
retained the dream of returning to
their village plots and old homes. The
Pl.O military seemed to make the
real ization of that dream feasible.
Israel's complete military victory has
now destroyed this illusion. In days
ahead, if extensive family visits are
permitted between Palestinians in
Lebanon and Arab Israelis, even the
illusion that this is a desirable goal
may disappear. For in the last 25
years, their Palestinian cousins in
Israel have become more Israeli, just
as they have become more Lebanese.
:viany Palestinians in Lebanon
already know that they would not
want to settle in an independent
Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza, let alone a partially auton-
OIllOUS one, because they recognize
that they would be regarded as
outsiders. Citizenship status in
LC'banon is thus preferable if it can be
,lttained. They are Lebanese in many
of their attitudes and habits and have
learned to benefit from the Milton
Friedman-world of Lebanese econ-
omic life. The potential thus exists for
a severe fracturing of the PLO, not on
its traditional ideological lines (though
that may also happen), but on
territorial ones. For, once the goal of
eliminating Israel as a state is clearly
seen to be unrealizable, then the
Lebanese Palestinians can go their
own way - provided there is a real
way to go -- while the Palestinians of
Gaza and the West Bank can truly
seck national self-determination in a
reasonably clearly defined territory
without needing to retain the objec-
tive of eliminating Israel. One
important consequence then of the
Israeli-PLO war of '1982 is the
severe damaging of the structural
underpinnings of PLO ideology.
There are, of course, significant
shifts in the politics of the region. It
Illay be true that on the one hand
the PLO resents the Arab states for
abandoning them when they were
trapped. However, on the other hand,
the Arab oil states can now feel free
from PLO military blackmail, though
perhaps not moral blackmail. The
Soviet Union has shown itself to be a
paper tiger, while the United States
has revealed its character as a tooth-
less lion unable to limit the actions of
its ally, Israel. What Israel has lost in
prestige as a moral power in inter-
national eyes, it has gained in status
as a military power in the region. And
in an area which gives obeisance to
the man with the gun, this is an
important factor.
It remains an open question
whether Syrian forces will withdraw
entirely from Lebanon or whether
Lebanon will be able to form a strong
central government. Bashir Gemayel's
ordering of a draft for all l8-year old
Maronite youth points to a Christian
dam inated state in Lebanon to paral-
lel the Jewish dominated state of
Israel. Even if a plausible future
scenario can be drawn from direct
consequences of the war, one can at
best only speculate about indirect
results. The most relevant scenario is
the loss of the West Bank and Gaza as
part of Israel. In spite of all the
enormous gains Begin has made as a
result of the war, and in face of the
moral superego attacks of the ex-
treme doves and the helpless thrash-
ing about of the moderate ones,
Begin may have sown the seeds for
the loss of his most cherished ideal -
the effective annexation and integra-
tion of the West Bank Uudea and'
Samaria) and Gaza into Israel.
The reasons are simple. The
ideology of the PLO is dominated by
those who needed to prove that they
could sOlve all Palestinians by satisfy-
ing the dream of return for even
those who came from Wh,lt is now
Israel. ~ow with the shattering of the
military forces of the PLO, different
groups of Palestinians in different
territories are free to pursue their own
particular interests. Lebanese
Palestinians, who have not yet been
able to get Lebanese citizenship can
clearly seek that objective. The
absolute loyalty of Jordanian Pales-
tinians to Jordan will be less suspect.
At the same time, the Gaza and West
Bank Arabs can begin to seek their
own interests without the debilitating
weakness of the claims of the PLO
covenant requ iring the destruction of
Israel.
At the present time, depression
is rampant among West Bank and
Gaza Arabs. Their helplessness as
their brothers in Lebanon were
severelv beaten is a cause for wide-
spread' guilt. They did not even
manage to organize any significant
strikes or demonstrations to at least
express their support, which may
have perhaps drawn away some of
the military resources of Israel. Thev
are resented by some, and, som~
resent in turn, the military fiction of
the PLO for leading them dOwn a
garden path to a wasteland.
However, they are now in a
posi~io.r~, .if they are clever ab?ut their
pOSSibIlities and do not cdntlllue the
self-destructive illusions of their
twentieth century history, to develop
a position politically stronger than
ever before. For along with the
destruction of the PLO has also
cl issolved Israel's argu ment regarding
pressing consideration for her security
needs, WhICh, though With de-
creasing effect, still tended to Over-
shadow the Palestinian demands for
self-determination in the West Bank
and Gaza.
The combination of the particu-
larization of Palestinian interests with
the loss of credibility of the Israeli
security argument can become the
most powerful of political arguments
in the international community and
within Israeli public opinion, if and
only if the means chosen to pursue
the goal of self-determination is
consistent with real Palestinian
interests and a non-threatening stand
towards Israel. If the Palestinians on
the West Bank show that they are
determining their own destinies and
are not being led by goals and
methods which are counterpro-
ductive to their own interests, if they
use peaceful means to give witness
to this will to self-determination, then
in spite of the enormous gains of the
Begin and Sharon audacious siege of
Beirut, the long term goals of annex-
ation may in fact be lost, as the
toothless lion and the paper tiger join
together with other members of the
international community to increase
the pressure to allow re'al autonomy
for West Bank and Caza Palestinians.
The reduction of the Palestinians
to a minority of inferior status within
an enlarged Israel is nevertheless also
possible. If the Palestinians opt to try
to create a new field of battle in the
West Bank and Gaza, one can
imagine the expulsion of Arabs just as
the Jews WE~re expelled by the
Romans from the same territories
about 2,000 years ago. However,
with a change of strategy, the Pales-
tinians can turn a military defeat into
a political victory. The Israel-PLO war
of '1982 might prove to be one of the
most important turning points in
Israel's history for reasons quite
different than the immediate objec-
tives of the war.
